


project DMZ

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# STOREFRONT

for Art & Architecture

97 Kenmare Street New York, NY 10012 212-431-5795

## "PROJECT DMZ"

### TABLE OF CONTENT

- Map of the Region
- List of Illustrations
- Introduction
- Premise
- Objectives
- Site
- A View on the Current Situation
- "Project DMZ" Guidelines
- Selected Bibliography
- Map of the DMZ
- Appendices
- Submission Form
- Storefront for Art and Architecture Info
- "Project DMZ" Organizing Committee



10






## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1. A gateway to the DMZ
2. "The price of freedom is eternal vigilance"
3. Building the concrete line between the barracks of the Military Armistice Commission
4. DMZ-scape
5. The Bridge of No Return (the official name)
6. Joined in arms
7. Anti-demonstration forces in the streets of Seoul
8. Lee Dee-Soo, student of Seoul National Univ. immolated himself in protest of U.S presence in South Korea
9. Unified Korea- for birds only
10. By default, the DMZ has become a wildlife refuge
11. A view across to Propaganda Village
12. Daily meeting of the Joint Observer Team
13. The concrete line divides the members of the Joint Observer Team
14. Over there is North Korea
15. The great leader comrade Kim Il Sung

1





## INTRODUCTION

STOREFRONT thanks you for your interest in "Project DMZ", an international project aimed at understanding the nature of human conflict through the generation of alternatives to the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. Viewing the Korean DMZ as a product of political, military and economic polarization, the project calls for the intervention of aesthetic forces to initiate possible paths toward reunification of the nation and its people.

"Project DMZ" is a forum inviting the participation of individuals of different generations, cultures and mediums of expression. This forum, a coalition of diverse individuals under common purpose, opposes specialization and division amongst intellectual fields and rather supports an environment for human exchange, a condition antithetical to the nature of the DMZ itself.


## PREMISE

The premise of this project is the Korean DMZ and the consequential dismemberment of a nation, society, culture and people. The DMZ represents not only the literal separation of a nation and fundamental ideological division but also symbolizes the zenith of economic, political and military conflict. The DMZ's illusionary representation of stability forbids the fundamental ingredient of dialogue and human contact necessary for human affairs that subsequently nurturs our need for unity and exchange. Ironically, the DMZ, site and symbol of neither war or peace, will result in either war or peace.

Korea, particularly, South Korea finds itself broiling in a highly charged solution of student uprising, worker strikes and preparation for the upcoming Olympics in Seoul. Demonstrations, which heretofore have found themselves relegated to political and labor issues and events, now occur at the DMZ itself with participants demanding that the nation be reunified. The DMZ, festering since its implementation, now demands to be addressed.







3

As a result of this widespread upheaval which threatens to cross over that barrier by defiant collective acts and the notion of the DMZ as simply a geographical divider, several questions and issues are raised. For instance, what is a meaningful response that art and architecture can make with regard to intense social anger and the usage of direct confrontation as a means to establish democracy and a unified people? What can artists and intellectuals do that is equally relevant and powerful as the acts of assertion that we see and read about such as self-immolation, marches, demonstrations and confrontations? Should they be involved at all?

## OBJECTIVES

This project seeks answers to these questions and others which may arise through proposals for events, strategies, designs, objects, ideas and other forms of action, taking place within the physical or conceptual framework of the DMZ, to generate a set of possibilities that could provoke the elimination of the DMZ through peaceful means. Although a critical assessment of the past and present state of the DMZ is essential, the project requests its participants to make proposals with regard to its future.




## SITE

The entire DMZ or any portion thereof.


## A VIEW ON THE CURRENT SITUATION

Historically the Korean political situation is quite complex. A few main points about Korea's recent history should be made in order for us to grasp the nature of the events that have affected the daily lives of people in North and South Korea.

The presence of the Demilitarized zone (DMZ) sustains mass hysteria and a sense of eminent catastrophe for North and South Korea. North Korea, by accusing Japan and the United States of being potential aggressors and masters of the S. Korean government, further centralizes their political power. This maintains a constant fear of invasion. N. Korea believes that without the support of the U.S. and Japan, S. Korea would not survive. In turn, S. Korea assumes that N. Korea holds tens of thousands of political prisoners and dissenters. Unfortunately, it is the N. Korean citizenship that is paying for threadbare economic stability and its own cultural stagnation. This stagnation is maintained by restricting citizens rights and by maintaining national entrenchment within its own borders.







5

North and South Korea spend an absurdly high percentage (approximately 30 % from each side) of their central government expenditure (C.G.E.) on guarding the DMZ. At the same time innumerable families have been split and are unable to reunite, visit or contact each other across the military boundary.

The U.S. justifies its military expenditure on buttressing the DMZ with the claim that the communists could destroy the economic prosperity of capitalist interests in South Korea.

In the recent past, the oppositional issues in South Korea were clearly anti-militaristic and anti-government, denouncing the government's misuse of power (imprisonment without due process, use of torture techniques and harsh quelling of protests). By association, it was the U.S. that stood accused of directing and supporting a government seen by the opposition as unpopular. Many critics have assumed that the U.S. government orchestrated repression against the Korean population, including the terrible Kwangju massacre. This massacre is considered a turning point in Korean politics. The Korean army, along with foreign forces, was thought to be conspiring against its people, particularly because the Korean army could only act with the knowledge and approval of the U.S. intermediate command, when it used deadly force at Kwangju. However, despite the central role of the U.S. military, the main effort of earlier oppositional struggles was to remove the Korean army from power.

Currently, radical opposition activists understand that the blame placed on the U.S. and other superpowers, for their part in maintaining the division of the country as well as keeping portions of the country marginally developed, goes back to the very origins of the Korean war. At that time the U.S. knowingly allowed N. Korea to cross the division border. This allowed the U.S. to install its power deeper into Korean affairs.

Interestingly, around the time of the burning down of the "American Cultural Service Center" (after the Kwangju massacre), only a small percentage of the Korean population had anti-American feelings. Currently, a much greater percentage are hostile to the continued presence of the American government as an occupying military force.




In the past, S. Korean anti-communist laws had been enforced to crush any opposition to the military government, and currently these laws allow the power elite to hold onto their rule. This, of course, precludes any real democratic development in S. Korea.

The recent "democratic" restructuring of the S. Korean Government into elected parties, supposedly allowing for an oppositional voice, only complicates the political picture as well as diverting the popular opposition.

While it would appear that the three Kims (i.e. Kim Young Sam, leader of the opposition conservative party representing the middle class, Kim Dae Yong, representing the poor and working class and Kim Jong Pil, related to the former president Park) would potentially terminate the military's monopoly of power, with a democratic opening-up of debate and choice, the situation is actually little changed for all practical purposes.

The last presidential election saw the reelection of the ruling party because of a split vote within the opposition parties. After the election, people focused their disappointment on this lack of cohesion within the opposition parties. What kept public anger at bay was supposedly that the country was under enormous economic development with great hope for the future.

The economic benefits were far from creating a strong base. Wages were kept low, working conditions were exploitative and unemployment loomed on the horizon. The country was also far from full democratization. Worsening the economic picture was the trade problem. In particular, the persistent interference and pressure by the U.S. disrupted local sectors of economy such as farming, meat production and cigarette manufacturing. U.S. leverage was far greater than that which constitutes an acceptable level. To this, one must add the burden of having to wastefully spend one-third of the C.G.E. on military expenditure to maintain an unwanted barrier, the DMZ.





A major shift in the balance of power in S.Korea seems to be on the verge of occurring within the composition of the electorate. This is visible in changing attitudes toward the government and relative lack of fear. The current electorate, 40 % percent of which did not witness the Korean War, is not as docile as the previous generation and thus does not accept the imposed intimidation or the fictional threat of N.Korean invasion. This might possibly dispel the myth of communist takeover that has been preached to the S. Koreans by the ruling governments throughout modern history.

This year the student movement in S.Korea has taken up reunification as its central issue for political and social democratization. This is in opposition to the military and ruling parties ineffectual attitudes towards unification. The student movements struggle and slogans for a reunified country have forced the government to take a serious look at an issue that it previously monopolized, using it only to divert attention away from other equally serious problems. This seeming change of focus by the current opposition is in reality a greater accusation against the country's internal ruling military and monied elite. The ruling military and monied elite have always been perceived as having compromised the interests of the country in order to preserve their position of power.

In North Korea a younger generation is also less interested in ideological orthodoxy, rather they seem to express readiness for liberalized experimentation. As soon as their present ruler passes from office, the new generation will probably oppose Jungil Kim, his son, from assuming power.


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Currently, there exists a widespread desire, shared by both sides and both generations, to witness the country's eventual reunification. However, each side perceives the realization of reunification quite differently. North Korea supports a non-aligned, independent country that could potentially sustain itself without outside intervention. South Korea has always maintained a powerless and immobile "reunification ministry". This ministry has made no real effort to deal with the reunification process, primarily because the ruling government fears the occurrence of reunification and an integrated democratic society as a threat to its existing power.

The discussion is now open to ways of making two different economic systems work side by side. Where the construction of a single country, an association, a commonwealth or other variations of unity would allow for the reunification of one people locked in two states, divided by the marking of an old and obsolete war.





## "PROJECT DMZ" GUIDELINES

### A. Eligibility

Work submitted for "Project DMZ" is divided in two categories: invited submissions and curated submissions. The first body of work is comprised of individuals who have demonstrated their dedication and achievement within their field. The second body, curated submissions, will be work from those people or groups who have responded to our public call for submissions. Please take note that as a result of space limitations the curated body of work is subject to a review process and therefore not all submissions may be exhibited.

Invited participants interested in submitting work for "Project DMZ" should notify the organizing committee no later than September 15, 1988 in order to receive an information packet.

All other individuals and groups interested in participating in "Project DMZ" will be sent a package upon receipt of a \$15 fee at the Storefront by September 15, 1988. Please make checks payable to Cultural Council Foundation (Storefront).



## B. Exhibition and Publication

All invited submissions and those curated submissions selected by the organizing committee will be exhibited at Storefront for Art and Architecture in November and December of 1988. The committee will select as many or as few of the curated submissions as it considers appropriate for the exhibition. All submissions will be included in the accompanying catalogue.

## C. Deadlines

Submissions will be accepted at Storefront up until October 24, 1988 (6 pm EST for USA). Please note that the work must be on the Storefront premises by that date.

## D. Submissions

All wall mounted works must not exceed 20" x 30" (0.5 x 0.76 m) and must not project away from the surface of the wall more than 8" (0.20 m).

Due to the limited space, those producing free-standing works must submit a description of the size and volume of the work envisioned by October 1, 1988.

Text submissions shall be double spaced typed on 8 1/2" x 11" (or A4) paper and should not exceed 5,000 words. All necessary illustrations should accompany the text. It is the author's responsibility to secure reproduction rights for any illustrations or photographs submitted with the text.






Any work not conforming to the above categories or having special requirements should also be brought to the attention of the organizing committee by October 1, 1988.

Submissions must be accompanied by images of the work suitable for reproduction in the "Project DMZ" catalogue. We would prefer these images to be 8' x 10" black and white glossy prints, or other reproducible material.

Shipping of submissions to Storefront as well as the return of work after the exhibition is the responsibility of the participant. Durable packaging and the necessary return postage ensuring safe delivery of works is requested. Works which are to be picked up must be arranged for ahead of time. All work not claimed by January 31, 1989, will be considered a donation to Storefront for Art and Architecture which may use or dispose of them as it sees fit.

Storefront shall have the right to publish, display, reproduce or otherwise publicize all submissions. The authors of the submissions will be identified in all such publications and displays. Storefront shall have the exclusive right to issue all public announcements regarding "Project DMZ". Although the participant may retain the copyright of his or her submission, Storefront retains the right to use submissions for the purposes of the project, including the right to exhibit, reproduce and publish submissions without compensation and the right to use the submissions for discussion, debate or traveling exhibition without compensation.

Submission must be accompanied by the signed entry form supplied with this packet. This form must be in an envelope and must be attached to the work. Reproductions of the form are acceptable.





### E.Credits and Statements

Any statements or credits regarding the work that should be included in press releases, exhibitions or publications should also be included in the envelope attached to the work.

### F."Project DMZ" Mailing Address

All submissions and related correspondence should be addressed to:

"PROJECT DMZ"

Storefront for Art and Architecture

97 Kenmare Street

New York,N.Y.10012

U.S.A.






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
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


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







LINE OF DEMARCATION, 1953 MILITARY ARMISTICE  
DEMILITARIZED ZONE EXTENDS 2 KILOMETERS (1/2 MI)  
ON EACH SIDE OF THE LINE OF DEMARCATION.


ASIAN COAST













I.R.S.: Then I would advise you to hire an accountant, and perhaps a lawyer.

JOYCE: (*To himself*) And to think my sainted mother wanted me to be an accountant—or a lawyer. Niver a writer. Shiver ye writhers. Writhing in Hell—Infernal Revenue! 'Tis jail, Jim, thirty years to Liffey. Or end the exile. Back to Ireland, I.R.A. land, where they don't tax authors to debt. A tax haven will be my Heaven. Yes, I said, yes.

(EXIT, *singing in a fine tenor, "A' little bit of heaven fell to earth. . . . Sure they called it Ireland."*)

## Korean Tripwire

Each year, Siberian cranes flock to the Demilitarized Zone in Korea. North and South Korea, still technically at war, have an unspoken accord to leave the great birds undisturbed. The cranes—a Korean symbol of life and a peaceful home—are an endangered species. On the DMZ, they nest amid lethal firepower, a small example of North-South cooperation suggesting that sanity can prevail over ideology.

Nearly 1 million hostile troops glare at one another across Korea's DMZ. In the 1950s, the Korean War took more than 2 million Korean lives (civilian and military), and 667,000 Chinese and 33,600 American lives. Today, with an American nuclear tripwire stretched across the Korean peninsula, a second war could likely trigger an American nuclear attack on North Korea. Until South Korea's recent political unrest, most Americans had forgotten that more than 40,000 American servicemen are stationed in Korea. Those troops are reportedly armed with some 150 tactical nuclear weapons which are stored at Kunsan Air Force Base. They are on a higher state of alert than any other U.S. forces in the world. U.S. troops sit between 480,000 North Korean and 160,000 South Korean soldiers dug in along the DMZ.

Korea is the only place in the world, besides Germany, where nuclear war could conceivably erupt with little or no prior notice. And today the political situation in Korea is far more volatile than in Germany. What's more, ever since the United States introduced nuclear weapons into Korea in 1958, it has stuck to its "first use" doctrine. This stance raises the specter of a nuclear war in Korea expanding to a nuclear shootout between U.S. and Soviet naval forces in the North Pacific. The ever-present threat of escalation lends Korea's conflict a global significance.

According to American military officers, Pentagon strategy entails defending South Korea by striking deep into North Korea, including its capital, Pyongyang. It also integrates ground and air, and conventional and nuclear, forces. This year's huge annual U.S.-South Korean military exercise, Team Spirit, was a dry run of an air-land battle deep strike in conjunction with the use of nuclear weapons. The strategy is justified as a deterrent to a North Korean blitz to grab Seoul. But many American analysts dismiss such a scenario. North Korea, they say, knows it

cannot win a conventional war against South Korea.

More likely, we're told, North Korea plans to exploit a political crisis in South Korea by infiltrating small groups of guerrillas against whom American nuclear weapons and an air-land battle would be useless. Indeed, some political analysts argue that close U.S. ties with South Korea's unpopular military may fuel precisely such a crisis in the South. Fearing threats to its survival, North Korea, moreover, has sometimes adopted a strategy of locating military facilities near civilian population centers, rendering the use of nuclear weapons problematic. The hairtrigger offensive posture adopted by both sides along the DMZ fans mutual fears of a surprise attack. The resulting race to acquire offensive weapons strengthens each side's worst-case interpretations of the other's intentions. Today's domestic unrest in South Korea makes it appropriate to ask again if nuclear weapons should be stored on the Korean peninsula. Instead of deterring the North, those weapons may stimulate a dangerous nuclear arms race and undermine conventional deterrence. Furthermore, in a crisis, either the North or the South would be tempted to launch a pre-emptive strike to head off an imminent attack.

There is another, nonnuclear path for American foreign policy in Korea. First, the United States should encourage civilian democracy in South Korea. A nonmilitary government would be more likely to promote progress in North-South talks and keep Korea's security deadlock from simply deteriorating. To this end, the United States should withdraw its de facto support for the South Korean military's political role. Of course, only South Korean leaders can order their military back to the barracks. But the United States must clearly signal its support for such a move.

Second, the United States should demilitarize relations with North Korea by recognizing it diplomatically. Relying on the American military to communicate with North Korea through such channels as the Military Armistice Commission, rather than the State Department, has allowed the military tail to wag the diplomatic dog. Third, the United States should withdraw its nuclear weapons from Korea. It should also announce that it will disengage its ground forces when North and South Korea's offensive forces are reduced in an equitable, planned manner. The United States might also reduce the size and frequency of exercises such as Team Spirit. Fourth, the United States should initiate regional arms control talks for the North Pacific. The Korean knot can't be untied without slackening the naval and nuclear arms race offshore.

Those four steps would loosen Korea's nuclear tripwire before events in the region further deteriorate. Given the region's current tensions and instability, nuclear weapons in Korea needlessly endanger millions of Koreans and Americans—not to mention the humble Siberian crane.

PETER HAYES, WALDEN BELLO AND LYUBA ZARSKY


*Peter Hayes, Walden Bello and Lyuba Zarsky are co-authors of American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific (Viking-Penguin) and military analysts for Nautilus Pacific Research, a think tank on Asia and the Pacific.*



COVER STORIES

# Under Siege


*As unrest spreads, South Korea faces a crisis of Olympic proportions*

 Charging into a crowd of several thousand protesting students one night last week in the huge square in front of the Bank of Korea, a unit of 80 riot police suddenly found themselves cut off from reinforcements. A sea of chanting demonstrators quickly surrounded the police, who had already used up their supplies of pepper gas, a concentrated and

particularly painful form of tear gas. Outnumbered and overwhelmed, the police, many of them young conscripts, knelt in terror behind their riot shields, trying to fend off a torrent of rocks and gas canisters thrown by the students. The protesters began beating the police, then confiscating shields, helmets and other equipment. As the police were finally escorted to safety by student leaders, the

crowd set fire to two piles of the collected gear.

The scene was rich in symbolism: instruments of authoritarian control put to the torch, while their former wielders cowered in fear. Was it, spectators may have wondered, a preview of South Korea's future? Throughout the country last week, students erupted in a frenzy of defiant marches and demonstrations to pro-






test the six-year rule of President Chun Doo Hwan. Night after night they battled with tens of thousands of police, militia and plainclothes officers, who sought to break up the crowds with judo punches, shields and the virulent pepper gas, whose acrid fumes lingered for hours over the scenes of combat.

As the week of violence wore on, more than two dozen police outposts were reportedly destroyed or damaged, and hundreds of people on both sides were injured. On Friday a policeman died after being run over by a commandeered bus in the central city of Taejon. A student in Seoul was in a coma, near death, after being struck in the head by a rifle-fired gas canister. In a country where student-led protests have become a tradition, last week's disturbances were the most serious in seven years.


The latest wave of demonstrations broke out two weeks ago to protest the selection of Roh Tae Woo, chairman of the ruling Democratic Justice Party, as its nominee for President in the national elections scheduled for later this year. But in contrast to the first disturbances, which involved only a few thousand students



and were primarily limited to Seoul, the capital, last week's demonstrations drew crowds as large as 50,000 and flared in more than two dozen cities. In the southern port of Pusan, according to some reports, protesters burned five municipal buses and seized a garbage truck as a makeshift barricade. In Taejon a crowd of 6,000 marchers fire-bombed two police

stations. On Wednesday night alone, crowds laid siege to 17 police outposts, two Democratic Justice Party district offices, and two buildings of the state-run Korean Broadcasting System.

The government responded by shutting down more than 50 major universities two to three weeks before summer vacation was to begin. But many students refused to accept the chance for an early holiday, remaining on or near the campus for nightly antigovernment rallies. In perhaps the most momentous development, the protests for the first time received the support of segments of South Korean society other than students. Housewives, businessmen and assorted onlookers shouted encouragement and occasionally joined the marchers, who in many cases were their sons and daughters. In Pusan, the country's second largest city and the scene of a demonstration involving 50,000 people, Presbyterian Minister Cho Chang Sop, 60, proudly reported that both of his college-age children had joined the protest. Said he: "Nowadays most of the parents support the kids." In Songnam, ten miles south of Seoul, a protest march led by a group of about 100 elderly people was



■ A scene rich in symbolism: riot police, outnumbered and overwhelmed, cower as chanting demonstrators put helmets, shields and other instruments of authoritarian control to the torch

■ The problem that was waiting to happen: "Tokchae Tadol!" (Down with the dictatorship!)

■ A change in the weather: for the first time frustrated and angry students are joined by housewives, businessmen and elderly people





joined by some 5,000 Koreans. "People are angry and disgusted," said a Seoul businessman. "They are willing to risk a bit more now than before."

If that is so, it could be bad news indeed for Chun and Roh at a time when their political scenario calls for nothing but happy headlines. South Korea is enjoying a period of spectacular economic growth, which has averaged about 8% annually over the past 20 years and is currently surging at 15.7% (vs. about 4.8% for the U.S. and 1.2% for Japan). Though South Korea lacks a democratic tradition, Chun's plan to turn over power next February to Roh, a longtime friend and fellow army general, would mark the first orderly presidential succession since the country became a republic in 1948. Finally, South Korea hopes that its being host of the 1988 Summer Olympics, scheduled to begin just 15 months from now, will serve as evidence of a new national maturity, much as the 1964 Tokyo Games ratified Japan's arrival as a world power.

One consequence of prosperity has been the emergence of a sizable middle class. In opinion surveys, as many as 80% of South Koreans describe themselves as members of that group. While the middle class embraces a work ethic that naturally abhors instability, it has begun to chafe under the strict, sometimes repressive rule of South Korea's military-dominated government. Last week's convulsions did not amount to a full-scale rebellion or draw a massive government crackdown. But the disturbances recalled the fate of South Korea's first President, Syngman Rhee, who was unseated by massive student demonstrations in 1960. The virulence and ubiquity of the protests were enough to give South Korean leaders a first-rate scare. Said Hyun Hong Choo, a Democratic Justice Party member of the National Assembly: "If the violence continues, it threatens the economy, the national security, the nation. We are very concerned."

So are many non-Koreans, including officials of the Reagan Administration. The U.S. maintains 40,000 troops in South Korea, a military presence that has persisted since the end of the Korean War in 1953. With the heavily armed Soviet- and Chinese-backed Communist dictatorship of North Korea just across the Demilitarized Zone, South Korea serves strategically, along with West Germany, as a kind of point man for the non-Communist world. Instability in Seoul could tempt Communist North Korea, governed by the less than predictable Kim Il Sung, 75, to launch a military adventure that could draw the U.S. into another Asian war. Though U.S. leverage in South Korea is limited, its stake in the country's future is considerable. Writing in the *New York Times* last November, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer and Edward J. Baker, a Harvard Asian-affairs specialist, declared, "Next to the Middle East, South Korea is probably the part of the world where American interests and world peace are most threatened."

■ **Shoulder to shoulder:** a recent poll taken for the government indicates that 65.2% of respondents are either "dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied" with the Chun regime

■ **Shades of Manila:** although church participation is evocative of the People Power revolution in the Philippines, many of the factors that contributed to Marcos' ouster are absent

■ **The President and his anointed successor:** though Roh's selection was hardly a surprise, the ceremonial neatness and finality of the act struck many South Koreans as arrogant



The U.S. has been following the South Korean crisis closely in the hope that Washington can somehow help bring it to an end. Among other statements last week, the State Department counseled against any attempt to forcibly dislodge a group of 500 students who took refuge in Seoul's Myongdong Roman Catholic Cathedral. The protesters eventually left of their own accord. Secretary of State George Shultz, who was attending an ASEAN foreign ministers' conference in Singapore, declared, "Our advice is somehow to resume the process of dialogue between the government and the opposition so that a method of establishing a democratic tradition can be worked out in a mutually agreeable way." Even President Reagan felt obliged to add his concern. According to the *New York Times*, the President sent a letter to Chun urging him to reopen talks with the opposition aimed at reaching a compromise. But Washington seemed reluctant to acknowledge that its own close association with the Chun regime over the years was no small part of the problem or that its historic failure to apply skillful pressure for democratic reforms threatens to worsen an already widespread atmosphere of anti-Americanism in South Korea.

For years South Korea has been a problem waiting to happen. Chun seized power in 1980, moving into the vacuum

created a year earlier by the assassination of President Park Chung Hee, his longtime mentor. The product of a modest rural background, Chun was graduated from South Korea's military academy in 1955, and is a combat veteran of the Viet Nam War. Chun consolidated his hold in a 1981 presidential election that was conducted under martial law and excluded all but token opposition candidates. Even by South Korea's standards of political legitimacy, the former army general was widely regarded as a usurper. In 1980 Chun was among those in the South Korean high command who ordered heavily armed troops to quell a popular uprising in the city of Kwangju, resulting in at least 180 deaths. He has been blamed for, though he was not personally involved in, a series of financial scandals, including several that implicated members of his family. "Because Chun lacked legitimacy, he had to build power through money and through violence," said a South Korean university economist. "This has brought on corruption and the use of the police and security forces to secure his position."

What legitimacy Chun does possess he owes in part to solid support from the Reagan Administration. In 1981 Chun became one of the first foreign heads of state to be received by the new U.S. President. Richard Walker, a former U.S. Am-





bassador to Seoul, recently described the 1985 South Korean parliamentary elections, which were criticized by many observers as having been weighted in the government's favor, as "generally free and fair." The current U.S. ambassador, former CIA Official James R. Lilley, testified at his Senate confirmation that he regarded South Korea's national security as more important than democratic reforms. The Reagan Administration, its critics say, urges Chun to move toward democracy but fails to complain when he refuses to budge. Said a student in Seoul: "If America does not change its attitude, the anti-Americanism here will grow."

**C**hun promised from the outset that he would serve only a single seven-year term as President. He agreed to open negotiations on a series of constitutional and electoral reforms. The parliamentary opposition, led by Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam (see following story), had as its main goal the abolition of South Korea's electoral college, a panel of more than 5,000 elected delegates that chooses the President. Instead, the opposition wanted direct elections for a chief executive. The electoral-college system favors the ruling party, according to its critics. Since an elector is allowed to change his announced vote at the last minute, they say, the government

can easily get its way through bribes and the promise of favors.

The Democratic Justice Party, on the other hand, preferred a parliamentary rather than a presidential form of government. Looking ahead to the possibility that they could become a minority in the next election, party leaders decided a parliamentary system could still allow its leaders to retain control of Parliament. One method: the government party can buy off minor parties to get enough votes to counter a split opposition. One segment of the opposition was amenable to the parliamentary idea, but negotiations dragged on for months without reaching a compromise, and both sides can be blamed for obstinacy. But Chun angered the opposition when, on April 13, he abruptly announced that bargaining on the reforms would cease until after the Olympic Games. By that time, conveniently for the government, the new President scheduled to take office next February will have been long since installed, with a mandate to serve until 1995. "Chun mistakenly defined democracy as the transfer of power from one authoritarian military man to another," says a South Korean academic.

The student protest movement, meanwhile, was in the throes of reorganization. In their demonstrations last fall, the marchers had been discredited in the

eyes of many South Koreans by their use of ultra-radical slogans, which the government shrewdly equated with support for North Korea. But over the winter the students toned down their rhetoric. The two most popular slogans currently in use are "*Tokchae Tadol!*" (Down with the dictatorship!) and "*Hohun Tadol!*" (Down with the decision not to amend the constitution!). The latest scandal in the confrontation belongs to the government: police admitted they had tortured to death a Seoul University student during interrogation and then tried to cover up the incident, prompting Chun last month to shake up his Cabinet.

The culmination of Chun's missteps was his decision to anoint his successor, a classmate at the military academy, before some 7,000 delegates at a Democratic Justice Party convention in Seoul on June 10. Though Roh's selection was hardly a surprise, even to the opposition, the ceremonial neatness and finality of the act, represented by the self-confident, almost cocky, scene of the two men with hands raised high, struck many South Koreans as extremely arrogant. Complains a 24-year-old medical student at Seoul National University: "The Korean people want a President who is elected by the Korean people."

The students have found influential allies for their cause in South Korea's reli-



■ Builder of both ships and cars, Hyundai has shaken the U.S. auto industry with its Excel, which has sold 168,800 units since first appearing in the U.S. last year



gious communities, including the Buddhists and the large Protestant denominations. The Roman Catholic Church, though it accounts for only about 5% of the country's 42 million people, has also grown increasingly outspoken in its calls for reform. Following the voluntary evacuation of Myongdong Cathedral by 500 student occupiers last week, Stephen Cardinal Kim Sou Hwan, the Archbishop of Seoul, offered a Mass for the nation there. Some 3,000 people, many of them middle class and middle aged, filled the church to overflowing. At least 5,000 others remained outside despite a late spring cloudburst. Said Cardinal Kim: "The government must return to the negotiating table after retracting the April 13 decision to postpone the debates on democratic constitutional reform."

The Catholic connection is often cited by South Korean dissidents as one of several similarities between their movement and the church-aided People Power that swept Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos out of office 15 months ago. Other alleged parallels include U.S. backing for the Chun government and the high level of moral outrage that animates the opposition. But the two cases are hardly comparable. South Korea's highly disciplined army is considered unlikely to defect to the opposition side, as its counterpart did in the Philippines. In addition, many of the economic and social factors that contributed to the Philippine revolution—the wide disparities in wealth, the parlous state of the economy, the inextinguishable Communist insurgency—are absent in South Korea. Wrote Reischauer and Baker: "In the Philippines . . . the political situation was more confused and power was less concentrated on one group."

Even though People Power may not be about to triumph in South Korea, the

popularity of the Chun government, never very high, is dwindling fast. According to Selig Harrison, a Korea scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a recent poll taken for the government by the daily *Kyunghyang Shinmun* indicated that 65.2% of respondents were either "dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied" with the Chun regime; only 21.7% described themselves as "satisfied." Like most other news that portrays the government in an unflattering light, the survey was suppressed.

**T**hose high levels of discontent are remarkable in a society that has progressed from poverty to prosperity in just over a generation. The country boasts a literacy rate of 98%, one of the world's highest, and one-third of its high school graduates go to college. More than 80% of South Koreans are city dwellers, up from 43% in 1963. Per capita income has risen from \$105 a year in 1965 to \$2,300 today. Though that is about \$1,000 less than the level achieved by Taiwan, which has reached a roughly comparable stage of development, South Koreans are generally well off by Asian standards.

The economy's current boom is fed by a burst of exports. During the first four months of 1987, shipments of South Korean electronics, textiles, automobiles and other products soared by 37.2% over the same period last year. The Hyundai Excel, introduced in the U.S. last year, sold an astonishing 168,800 units, twice the original projection, to become the most successful new car import in U.S. automotive history. Last week General Motors introduced its new Pontiac LeMans, a model manufactured for the Detroit carmaker by the giant South Korean conglomerate Daewoo. Ranked as Washing-

ton's seventh largest trading partner, South Korea last year registered a \$7.6 billion trade surplus with the U.S. as well as its first positive overall trade balance.

Despite such success, the South Korean economy faces some enduring problems. The country financed its industrial explosion with \$43 billion in foreign borrowings, up from only \$8.4 billion a decade ago. That is the fourth largest debt burden of any developing nation. So far South Korea has had no difficulty meeting its interest payments, unlike some other heavy borrowers, but critics of the country's high-debt strategy charge that it will keep Seoul dependent on ever expanding export markets. Moreover, much of South Korea's manufacturing output relies on technology and parts imported mostly from Japan and assembled in Korea to take advantage of low labor costs (average hourly wage for autoworkers: \$2.50, vs. \$12.50 in Japan). Imports of foreign manufactured parts do little to develop South Korea's technological base.

South Korean officials worry that the dizzying rise in imports may be too much of a good thing. Domestically, the spurt in overseas sales threatens to set off an unwelcome and potentially dangerous round of inflation, which is running at a low 2% annually. Overseas, South Korea's rising trade surpluses with the U.S. and other countries have prompted calls for protectionist countermeasures. Many of the proposals are motivated not simply by economic considerations but also by distaste for the Chun regime. Last week bills were introduced in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives calling for the elimination of \$2.2 billion of duty-free and preferential trade benefits for South Korean products unless the country makes solid gains in democratic reforms and the protection of human rights.



■ Living the good life: the country boasts a literacy rate of 98%, one of the world's highest; one-third of its high school graduates go to college



Officials in Seoul have begun to acknowledge the potential danger of U.S. protectionist sentiment. Beginning in July, South Korean exporters will observe "voluntary" restraints on shipments to the U.S. of ten sensitive items, including videocassette recorders, television sets and microwave ovens. "I could not have suggested this export-cutting program six months ago," says Trade and Industry Minister Rha Woong Bae. "I would have been called a traitor."

As Chun faces the gravest political crisis of his career, he has remained resolutely silent, conferring with top aides inside the Blue House, his official residence. Furthermore, perhaps to keep the students and their supporters in the opposition off-balance, he has allowed contradictory hints to be dropped about his next moves. One moment his associates are whispering darkly that a new crackdown is imminent. The next they are suggesting that talks with the opposition might be reopened. At week's end South Koreans thus had little idea what to expect in the immediate future.

One possibility would be for the government to find some way of reaching a compromise on the constitutional issue, or at least on electoral reform. Roh, who is thought to be a bit more flexible than Chun, implied such a solution when he told a group of South Korean reporters, "Our party will work out measures to cope with the present situation, respecting as much as possible public opinion and the people's aspirations as demonstrated in recent developments." An unnamed Democratic Justice Party official widely quoted in the Seoul press also seemed to indicate that Chun was backpedaling on the constitutional question, saying that if the charter could be rewritten by September, "it would not make our schedule invalid." The only reason that Chun originally foreclosed any such revision in

April, he added lamely, was that it "hardly seemed possible because of the split-up of the opposition party."

Opposition Leader Kim Young Sam called on Chun to "rescind the April 13 decision" and proposed talks between himself and the President. But Kim placed conditions on such a meeting: the release of some 1,500 demonstrators still in jail and the lifting of Kim Dae Jung's ten-week-old house arrest. Short of complying with those stipulations, Chun might submit the issue of whether to amend the constitution to a referendum, which it would almost certainly win. That would allow the President to let the matter be settled by popular will without forcing him explicitly to back down from the decision of April 13. Yet even that solution would be seen as a compromise, perhaps even a retreat—concepts that run counter to age-old tradition in South Korean public life.

**C**onversely, the government could decide to crack down hard on the protesters. That possibility became more than idle speculation Friday night during a six-minute television address by Prime Minister Lee Han Key. Warning that "violent and illegal activities will not gain genuine democratic development desired by all citizens," Lee added, "Should it become impossible to restore law-and-order through [self-restraint] alone, it would be inevitable for the government to make an extraordinary decision." He did not elaborate, nor did he need to. An "extraordinary decision" could only mean emergency government powers, perhaps even martial law.

Chun has shown that he is capable of taking such measures. Following the 1980 Kwangju uprising, as defense commander he helped preside over eight months of martial law. A new crackdown would obviously please hard-liners in the military,

who have long warned that the scant gestures toward liberalization so far permitted by Chun would lead to political chaos and who now feel vindicated. But the drawbacks to such a plan are numerous. First, it would be an admission to the world that the South Korean government can sponsor an Olympic Games but cannot exercise control over its own citizens except by using force. A new resort to toughness could also provoke a crisis in South Korea's relations with Washington.

A third outcome, though hardly one that Chun would enjoy contemplating, is a further deterioration in the situation that would lead to the eventual collapse of the government. In that case, the South Korean Army could not be expected to remain on the sidelines and allow the country to drift into chaos. But whatever tumult last week's demonstrations portend, and whatever the level of outrage they revealed, Chun's government still seemed far from collapse.


As the world's attention focused last week on the clouds of pepper gas, frenzies of rock throwing and flashes of bursting Molotov cocktails that seemed to pervade the country, the South Korean flag, known as the Taegukgi, seemed to be everywhere—brandished by crowds of protesters, hung from the newly completed Olympic facilities, fluttering over government buildings. A neat metaphor for the South Korean condition, the flag consists of a circle divided by a wavy line. The upper, red part represents the Yang and the lower, blue part, the Um—the two ancient, opposing symbols of the cosmos, representing fire and water, dark and light, destruction and construction. After pulling itself up from the chaos and rubble of war to a position of wealth and influence among nations, South Korea will now have to decide which half of its divided soul will prevail.

—By William R. Doerner. Reported by Barry Hillenbrand and K.C. Hwang/Seoul



# KOREA REPORT

Vol. I, No. 1 March 1987 NEWS AND ANALYSIS OF KOREAN AFFAIRS



*Korea is divided North and South by some 155 miles of Demilitarized Zone. There are about 1.5 million soldiers, including 40,000 U.S. troops, facing each other across the DMZ. There exist over 600 U.S.—deployed nuclear weapons in south Korea. There are as much as 30 megatons of nuclear weapons in south Korea—enough to reduce the entire Korean peninsula to radioactive ashes.*

The Korean peninsula protrudes out of the Asian mainland into the Japan Sea. It is bordered by China to the northwest, Soviet Union to the northeast, and Japan to the southeast. Due to its rich natural resources and strategically important geopolitical position, Korea has been under constant invasion by foreign powers for many centuries. Yet, Korea is one of the most ethnically homogeneous nations in the world, and Koreans have maintained a unified kingdom for more than 1,200 years.

## CURRENT CRISIS

This ancient nation is caught in a worldwide crisis today. It is divided North and South by some 155 miles of DMZ. There are about 1.5 million soldiers, including 40,000 US troops, facing each other across the DMZ line, making Korea the most heavily militarized region in the world. Every spring the largest military exercise in the world—code named "Operation Team Spirit"—is held in south Korea involving over 200,000 soldiers including US troops from Okinawa, Guam,

Hawaii, and US mainland, as well as Japanese Self Defense Forces. In such militarily tense situation, there exist over 600 US deployed nuclear weapons in south Korea. In fact, Korea is one of the most likely place where the worldwide nuclear holocaust could start.

## WHY IS KOREA DIVIDED?

Korea was divided at the end of World War II, when Japan, which had invaded and forcefully occupied

*Continued on Page 12*

## Feature Continued

Korea, surrendered to the Allied Forces. Korea was a victim of the war, much like France, and Japan was the aggressor, much like Germany. Can you imagine post war Europe with France divided and Germany intact? However, that is what happened to Korea as the US occupied the south of 38th parallel and the Soviet the north. Thus an artificial and unjust division was imposed upon this ancient nation of over 1,200 years of history as a unified country, totally against its people's will. Since then the Korean peninsula became the center of postwar cold war conflicts in North-east Asia.

## SOUTH KOREA AND U.S.

Ever since its involvement in south Korea, U.S. has supported a series of unpopular oppressive dictatorships. For the past two decades south Korea has been ruled by regimes which came to power through military coup. Under such circumstances, U.S. influence over south Korea is indeed very great since almost the entire south Korean military is placed under direct U.S. command.

U.S. economic involvement is also extensive. Hundreds of U.S. multinational corporations such as IBM, Motorola, and Tandy corporation have direct investment in south Korea. Typically, they pay Korean workers less than one fifth of their American counterpart for the same work. Such low wage condition is maintained by brutal and often violent repression of the labor. Necessarily, there exist extensive human rights violations in south Korean society.

Despite this repression, there is strong and growing opposition move-

ment, made up of students, workers, farmers, and Christians. Recently, there is also growing anti-U.S. sentiment among the south Korean people. The crucial event was the 1980 Kwangju Uprising, which occurred in protest of the seizure of power by the current Chun Doo Hwan military regime. The then U.S. Commander, Gen. Wickam, approved the transfer of south Korean troops under his command in order to put down the uprising which resulted in massacre of 2,000 to 3,000 people.

## KOREA AND NUCLEAR CRISIS

It is estimated that there may be as much as 30 megatons of nuclear weapons in Korea. This is more than 2,000 times that of the bomb that exploded over Hiroshima, enough to reduce the entire Korean peninsula to radioactive ashes. These nuclear weapons are under the operational control of the U.S. command in Korea, and the U.S. may make a unilateral decision to use them without consulting Korea—unlike in western Europe where there must be prior consultation with all of the US allies concerned. These weapons are not needed to deter possible north Korean attack since north Korea does not have any nuclear weapons, and south Korea is at least equal if not superior to north Korea in conventional military strength. However, when considering U.S. world military strategy, the implications of the nuclear weapons in Korea become truly frightening. According to the present Reagan administration's 5-year defense plan, in the event of U.S.-Soviet conflict in the Middle East the U.S. may unilaterally start a war in

Korea in order to keep the Soviets busy, although Korea may have nothing to do with the events in the Persian Gulf region. When this happens, the nuclear weapons will probably be used since it is precisely this type of maneuver that is drilled in the yearly Team Spirit exercises: massive assault using comprehensive array of nuclear and chemical weapons. What the Soviet Union does, and what happens to Korea and the rest of the world is anybody's guess. The renowned physicist Hans Bethe has termed this U.S. military strategy as "doomsday scenario."

Nuclear nightmare is especially terrifying to Koreans as many Koreans already knew and suffered the horrors of nuclear destructions. At the time of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, there were about 100,000 Koreans in these cities. They were forcefully brought there by Japanese to work in the munition factories and other military supplies factories. 50,000 Koreans were killed immediately after the blast. The rest led the life of slow death suffering "A-bomb diseases" abandoned by the Japanese government and neglected by the south Korean dictatorships.

Some 30,000 Korean A-bomb victims are alive today, suffering, abandoned, and neglected. Also, 60 million Korean people are living as hostages of constant nuclear crisis. All concerned people in the developed nations, especially the U.S., need to work toward lasting peace and justice in Korea, because when it perishes, there may not be anyone left around to mourn the loss of this brilliant 5,000 year old civilization. □

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# Scenes From a Neighbor Kingdom


*North Korea is frozen in time, in ideology and in its prospects*




Only 27 miles north of embattled Seoul, across the 38th parallel, is another Korea, in every sense an opposite to the turbulent, economically dynamic South. Hunkered behind miles of barbed wire and minefields, Communist North Korea is a constant, sometimes threatening presence in South Korean life. Spartan, plodding, more regimented than all but a few other Communist nations, it seems to act with one corporate mind. That mind belongs to Kim Il Sung, 75, the "Great Leader" who has been whipping North Korea into a model Communist state for 39 years. Kim's stable despotism is backed by an 885,000-strong army, navy and air force, the world's sixth largest fighting force.

Ever since the three-year conflict that left more than 1 million Koreans and Americans dead, every stress and strain in relations between North and South has carried the possibility of another conflagration. The latest tensions surround North Korea's ongoing construction of a huge dam just north of the 151-mile Demilitarized Zone. South Koreans are convinced that, once completed, the dam will pose a major danger to Seoul. They fear that it will either collapse because of poor workmanship or, in a darker view, be deliberately burst by the Communists, perhaps as a prelude to invasion or in an attempt to disrupt the upcoming Olympics. In response, the South Koreans have begun construction of a countervailing "peace dam" that would trap any released waters and send them back north.

South Korean suspicions about the North are matched only by uncertainties about the country's future after the Great Leader dies. Kim's eldest son, Kim Jong Il, 46, has been designated as his father's political heir, but there have been rumbles of discord within the North Korean Communist Party about the succession. Until the senior Kim dies, little is likely to change. His portrait peers from virtually every room in every home, office, school and hotel, and his statue decorates most corners. In the streets, North Koreans keep their conversations to a murmur and move at a uniform pace. As the following images show, French Photographer Yann Layma found Kim's kingdom to be a place frozen in time, in ideology and in its prospects.








■ Lunchtime in Pyongyang: with cars and bicycles reserved for official use, the streets tend to be eerily silent and empty in the capital city's modern housing district

■ Construction site of the intimidating dam at Nampo that has left many South Koreans in fear of floods, invasions and major Olympic disruptions


■ Amid regimentation, agriculture is often bountiful: a cabbage harvest in the country's southern region













■ Under the steady gaze of Communist Leader Kim, a worker plies her trade in a glassware factory

■ At a high school in the capital city, students study a peculiar blend of Marxism and Korean nationalism that stresses economic self-sufficiency and abiding loyalty to the leader

■ Colorful propaganda posters brighten Pyongyang's spotlessly clean avenues

■ In a spartan room on a model farm, a peasant watches a daily three-hour political program that explains and exalts Kim's 999 published works

■ A standard-issue portrait of the ubiquitous Great Leader on display at a railway depot in the rural north







JOHN NORDELL

US guardpost in DMZ: At their closest, US and North Korean troops come within yards of each other

## Korea's DMZ on alert for ... the Olympics

By Gary Thatcher  
Staff writer  
of The Christian Science Monitor

### Panmunjom, Korean DMZ

Visitors to the 1988 Seoul Olympics will have an opportunity to see an attraction unlike any other in the world.

It's a place where visitors can move back and forth across the front lines of two warring nations simply by stepping over an imaginary line on a floor.

It's a place where the

weapon most frequently put to use by combatants of both sides is a camera.

And it's a place where victories are measured by the relative height of flagpoles and the decibel level of loudspeakers.

It is, of course, the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that has run between North and South Korea since the end of World War II. The South Korean government is preparing for an upsurge in DMZ tourism during the Olym-

pics, and the US command here is hardly discouraging the prospect. Some 85,000 visitors a year already tour the no-man's-land.

A visit to the DMZ underscores one of the central realities of Korea today: This is a country still at war. The war rarely breaks out into open hostility these days. Instead, it's played out in thousands of petty incivilities, propaganda stunts and, occasionally, outright provocations.

The hot war between North and South Korea was halted only through an armistice - not a peace agreement - in July, 1953. This year will mark the 35th year of uneasy calm between the two states.

A handful of ceremonial troops, under the aegis of the United Nations, act as the guarantors of peace. But, in fact, United States troops, nearly 40,000 of them spread throughout

Please see DMZ next page

may be on its way back into power. Even within Hawke's Labor Party, there's open discussion about the next party leader.

It may, however, be premature to count Hawke out. His political resiliency is legendary. And the next federal election is more than two years away. Still, there's little doubt the tide of public opinion has turned against Labor, and Hawke has his work cut out for him.

One of his tasks is to reverse perceptions of arrogance, of favoring big business, and of losing touch with the Labor Party's traditional working-class voter. Again, such criticisms are being aired within his own party.

As an editorial in the Sydney Morning Herald put it: "When the government is asking its traditional supporters to accept cuts in living standards, it is political madness for the prime minister to be seen partying with the business community's big spenders."

Until recently, Hawke has denied he is out of touch. He now cautiously admits, "Maybe there are some things I've got to do differently."

But Hawke vows the electoral setback will not change basic economic policy, despite the widely voiced view that voters are tired of Labor Party belt-tightening.

Ironically, such disaffection is occurring against the backdrop of some economic improvement. While workers have been stung by the fall in real wages, inflation and interest rates are coming down now. Commodity prices (about 75 percent of Australia's export income is from commodities) and the Australian dollar are rising. Whether the trend will continue is uncertain. But the federal government does expect a budget surplus this year.

The temptation for the Labor Party now is to loosen the purse strings. That might win voter support. But it would undermine significant progress being made on Australia's major economic weakness: a \$110 billion (Australian; US\$148 billion) foreign debt burden comparable to amounts owed by major Latin American debtor nations.

Still, the current account deficit has shrunk from 6 percent to about 4 percent of gross domestic product this year while job creation has risen. Treasurer Paul Keating argues that wages may not be keeping pace, but people have jobs.

The first test of Labor's fiscal resolve will come in May when Mr. Keating unveils the latest budget package, which is expected to include more cuts in

Please see WOE next page



## INTERNATIONAL

**DMZ** from preceding page

South Korea, form the bulk of the international police force.

Still, the focus of much of the tension between North and South Korea is on a handful of troops - 375 of them, half from the US and half from South Korea. They make up the elite guard force in what's known as the "Joint Security Area." It's the pocket of land, only about 1 kilometer across (.6 miles), where North and South Korea go about the official business of observing the armistice.

The force in the Joint Security Area acts as a tripwire in the event of North Korean aggression. It is a highly visible symbol of Western resolve to defend the South, with force, in the event of conflict.

Each day along the DMZ is a

test of wills and wiles, played out according to unwritten rules.

In the center of the area, for example, is one of the world's most unusual conference rooms. The line of demarcation between North and South Korea runs smack down the middle of it. When political or military discussions are held, the delegations enter from opposite sides and confront each other across a long conference table. Microphone cables, taped down the center of the tablecloth, mark the international boundary.

When the room is not in use, troops from both sides periodically enter, close off the other nation's entrance, and bring in tourists. Westerners are allowed to stroll about the room, and purchase (for \$1) a certificate marking their symbolic penetration of communist territory.

All the while, North Korean

security guards snap photographs of the visitors. These photographs are, according to US military officials, often doctored and then offered, sometimes years later, as proof of "provocations."

For that reason, a curious sort of defensive protocol has emerged. Westerners visiting the DMZ are prohibited from wearing blue jeans or running shoes - symbols of Western decadence - or raising their arms above their head, so that the gesture can't be photographically altered to appear menacing or offensive.

At their closest, US and North Korean troops come within yards of one another, with no barbed wire or bunkers to keep them apart. Both sides seem to have adopted stares as part of their arsenal. The North Koreans excel at communicating menace; US troops seem hands-

down winners at expressing contempt. There are thousands of complaints each year of harassments, real or imaginary, says Col. John L. Patrick, the commander of the US and South Korean troops in the area.

Both North and South Korea maintain civilian settlements in the DMZ, and each is supposed to showcase the relative advantages of capitalism and communism.

Koreans living in Panmunjom, on the southern side, are severely restricted in their movements, and must observe a strict curfew every night. The North Koreans have constructed an impressive set of buildings that appear to be uninhabited.

Some years back, the South Koreans erected a towering flagpole over Panmunjom to display their national emblem. The North Koreans erected an even

taller one; the flag alone is estimated to weigh 600 pounds.

At night, each side bombards the other with propaganda broadcasts through a network of loudspeakers. "You always think you've left your radio on," says Colonel Patrick.

Women are banned from the area, further heightening the sense of loneliness and isolation in the DMZ. The officer's club has been dubbed "The Monastery," and the American commanders call themselves the "Mad Monks." Sometimes, the isolation leads to disciplinary problems and unexpected episodes. At least six US servicemen have defected to the North over the years.

Still, Patrick says, it is in many ways a dream assignment for an American soldier. "Here," he says, "we know we are on the front line."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 1988

## Violence Erupts in Korea Over March North

SEOUL, South Korea, June 8 (AP) — Thousands of protesters battled the riot police today, hurling firebombs and rocks, as the Government began deploying 60,000 policemen to stop students from marching to the border with North Korea.

Students held rallies at many schools across the country in support of a march planned for Friday to demand the reunification of South Korea with the North. Violent clashes occurred at more than 10 campuses, where students dashed out to hurl firebombs and rocks at riot policemen, who responded with volleys of tear gas.

It was not known how many people were injured or arrested.

"Drive out the Yankees who enforce the partition of our land!" students shouted during the clashes. Protesters have demanded the withdrawal of 42,000 United States troops based in South Korea, contending the American presence hinders reunification of the divided peninsula.

Student leaders of the protests have called for a rally of 40,000 students at Yonsei University in Seoul on Thursday. They plan an overnight vigil before the 30-mile march to the North Korean border.

The police said the university would

be sealed off Thursday to block the rally, but student leaders threatened to stage violent protests in downtown Seoul if the police prevent the vigil from taking place.

Tens of thousands of riot policemen took up positions today around campuses and at other locations across the country to stop students from rallying in support of the march.

The police intercepted students as they marched in protest off university campuses in the southern city of Kwangju and the southeastern city of Taegu.

Some protesters vowed to commit suicide. Three students have killed

themselves in recent protests against the Government.

In Pusan, a southern port city, 5,000 students from 12 schools held a rally at a university before leaving for Seoul, although thousands of policemen guarded bus terminals and railway stations to block their way.

On campuses in other provincial cities, students occupied school buildings after faculty members refused their demands for transportation.

In an interview with the Seoul newspaper *Hankook Ilbo*, President Roh Tae Woo said he supports exchanges and debate between South Korean and North Korean students.

But the President urged students to leave contact with the North to official channels and cautioned against leftist or revolutionary movements trying to topple South Korea's democracy.

Leaders of opposition parties also appealed to students to postpone their plans for the march, saying it lacks national support.

Reunification has been a deeply emotional issue among Koreans since the peninsula was divided after World War II into Communist North Korea and pro-Western South Korea.

Most South Koreans support unification of the two Koreas, but many worry that North Korea is determined to invade the South, as it did in 1950.

North Korea, which has welcomed the student march, has selected a 13-member student delegation to attend a planned meeting with the South Korean students Friday at the border village of Panmunjom, inside the Demilitarized Zone dividing the two Koreas.



# South Korean Chief, in a Switch, Seeks Wide New Ties With North

By SUSAN CHIRA

Special to The New York Times

TOKYO, Thursday, July 7 — Announcing an important change in policy toward North Korea, President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea said today that he would allow trade, family visits and student exchanges with the North.

He also said he would encourage other nations, including the United States, to improve relations with North Korea.

In South Korea, public yearning to become part of one nation again runs deep, and pressure has been growing on Mr. Roh to take steps to bring the two Koreas closer together. Student protests have helped to place reunification at the top of the political agenda.

Mr. Roh's statement also comes at a

time of growing concern that North Korean agents might pose a terrorist threat to the Olympic games in Seoul in September.

In an eight-minute nationally broadcast speech this morning that was monitored here, Mr. Roh outlined several departures from the past. He addressed his speech to "my dear 60 million compatriots" in both North and South Korea.

Rather than trying to make North Korea a pariah state, Mr. Roh said South Korea would encourage its allies to improve relations and to trade with the North. He said he would allow representatives of South and North Korea to contact each other at international gatherings.

## A Call for Widespread Exchanges

Echoing student proposals, Mr. Roh called for widespread exchanges between South and North Koreans, including politicians, students, businessmen, journalists and athletes. And Mr. Roh pledged to improve relations with Communist nations like China and the Soviet Union, suggesting that his speech was also aimed at convincing those nations who have relations with North Korea that South Korea's foreign policy is changing.

"Today the world is entering an age of reconciliation and cooperation transcending ideologies and political systems," Mr. Roh said. "I believe we have now come to a historic moment when we should be able to find a breakthrough toward a lasting peace and

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THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, JULY 7, 1988

# Seoul, in Switch, Seeks New Ties With North

Continued From Page A1

unification on the Korean peninsula, which is still fraught with the danger of war amid persisting tension and confrontation."

Opposition leaders, who were invited to the presidential residence in advance of the speech to be briefed on its contents, praised Mr. Roh's statement as a welcome response to a public call for greater progress. Kim Dae Jung's Peace and Democracy Party issued a statement hailing the Government's "forward looking attitude." But the

party added, "We also hope that more concrete measures, including a peace agreement and a non-aggression pact between South and North Korea could be taken to guarantee peaceful coexistence."

It was not clear how North Korea would respond. North Korea has called for political and military talks to include representatives of both the Government and opposition parties, an offer Mr. Roh did not extend in his speech.

Several of the changes Mr. Roh urged, such as trade between the North and South, have been discussed in previous talks, but the two sides were

unable to agree. Nor is it clear whether the changes will satisfy students, who have planned a second march to the North to meet with North Korean students on Aug. 15. The police blocked the first on June 10.

## Sees Unification Before 2000

Several academic figures who have been active in the debate on reunification said they believed the public would welcome Mr. Roh's statement, but that because it did not outline specific proposals, it would probably not prompt immediate changes.

"I think it's a significant step and a further development in improving rela-

tions, but we cannot expect it will be achieved in the near future," said Shin Myung Soon, associate professor of political science at Yonsei University.

Mr. Roh said if the North showed "a positive attitude" toward his proposals, he would take further steps, and he predicted that the South and North "will be integrated into a single social, cultural and economic community before this century is out."

Korea was one nation for thousands of years. It survived invasions by the Chinese, Mongols and the Japanese, but was occupied by the Japanese from 1910 to 1945. At the end of World War II, fearing that Russian troops in Manchuria were poised to occupy the entire Korean peninsula, the United States drew a line at the 38th parallel, proposing that the Soviet Union occupy the northern half and the United States the

southern half. Subsequent talks that aimed at unifying the two halves and holding nationwide elections failed, and war broke out in 1950.

## Korean War Ends in Truce

Since 1953, when a truce ended the Korean War, both sides have lived in a hostile and uneasy peace. Except for a small family reunion in 1985, families on opposite sides of the Demilitarized Zone have not been able to visit, call or mail letters to each other. Talks on continuing such exchanges or broadening economic relations have repeatedly broken down, most recently in 1985.

North Korea regards the stationing of 40,000 American troops in the South and joint military exercises as a provocation and bar to reunification. But South Korea has produced evidence implicating the North in several

strikes at the South, including a 1983 bombing in Rangoon, Burma, which killed several high-level South Korean Cabinet officials and the planting of explosives that blew up a Korean Air Lines plane last November, killing 115 people.

## State Dept. Has No Comment

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 6 — The State Department had no immediate comment today on Mr. Roh's statement.

On June 30, after the South Korean Foreign Minister, Choi Kwang Soo, hinted at changes, the State Department welcomed the idea of expanded contacts between North and South Korea, saying they would reduce tensions.



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